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Secondary Picketing in Canada: Thoughts
for the Pepsi Generation
Henry Dinsdale* and Dan A wrey *
Before the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Retail, Wholesale and Department Store
Union, Local 558 v. Pepsi-Cola, the law on secondary picketing was a murky and often
inconsistent area of urisprudence. Yet the Court's attempt to clarify the issue by declaring the
per se legality of secondary picketing may have muddied the waters even more. Specifically, the
authors argue, the Court's reliance on the U.S. Supreme Court's Tree Fruits decision and the
distinction it draws between general and struck product picketing may have made the law
even more difficult to apply.
The authors contend that such a distinction ignores the economic realities of labour disputes.
In an effort to deal with these issues, The U.S. Supreme Court set out an important exception
to Tree Fruits in its Safeco decision, stating that any picketing which threatens neutral parties
with "ruin or substantial loss" should be restrained, even it falls within the struck product
category. In light of these decisions, American courts have found themselves grappling with the
difficulties inherent in quantifying the economic harmi of secondary picketing, a challenge
Canadian courts may well find themselves facing in the post-Pepsi context. The authors also
argue that the distinction between general and struck product picketing is inadequate in
dealing with so-called "merged products" where the struck product is so integrated into the
product of the neutral party that it is no longer identifiable to the publicat large.
Finally, the authors contend that by focusing on the literal content of the picketers' message,
instead of its effects, both courts underestimate the powerfulpsychological or "signalling" effect
picketing creates, which deters consumers, regardless of the picketers'stated target.
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Introduction
Over the course of half a century, questions about the legality of
secondary picketing in Canada resulted in the development of a
nebulous and often inconsistent body of jurisprudence. In the absence of
legislative intervention, Canadian courts struggled to balance conflicting
labour relations and free market principles when otherwise lawful
disputes between employers and unions escalated to include
"secondary "1 parties and locations. For the most part, judges navigated
these waters without meaningful guidance from our country's highest
court. In its 2002 decision, Retail, Wholesale and Department Store
Union, Local 558 v. Pepsi-Cola Canada Beverages (West) Ltd., the
Supreme Court of Canada made what many considered a long overdue
attempt to clarify whether, or under what circumstances, secondary
picketing is legal (or illegal) at common law. However, while the per se
legality of secondary picketing may no longer be in dispute, the
Supreme Court's reliance on the 1964 decision of the United States
Supreme Court in National Labor Relations Board v. Fruit & Vegetable
Packers & Warehousemen, Local 760 signals anything but a clearer path
for those embroiled in industrial conflict arising from labour disputes.
I. Secondary Picketing: the Rise and Fall of the
Illegal per se Doctrine
To properly understand the Supreme Court's decision in Pepsi, it is
necessary to consider the "unsettled and inconsistent"' body of
jurisprudence which preceded it. This begins with the decision of the
1. For clarity, the terms "secondary" and "secondary party" are employed
interchangeably in this article with the terms "neutral" and "neutral party."
2. Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union, Local 558 v. Pepsi-Cola Canada
Beverages (West) Ltd., [2002] 1 S.C.R. 146 [Pepsi].
3. National Labor Relations Board v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers & Warebousemen, Local
760 et al., 377 U.S. 58 (1964) [Tree Fruits].
4. Pepsi, supra note 2 at para. 16.
(2004) 29 Queen's L.J.
Ontario Court of Appeal in Hersees of Woodstock Ltd. v. Goldstein,' in
which may be found the genesis of the view that secondary picketing is
illegal per se. In Hersees, the union representing Deacon Brothers'
employees approached Hersees, a purveyor of the Deacon Brothers
goods, and asked it to refrain from ordering merchandise from Deacon
Brothers for the duration of the dispute. When Hersees refused, the
union organized a two-person picket outside the Hersees retail outlet.
Each picketer carried a sign notifying potential customers that Hersees
was selling Deacon Brothers products that were made using non-union
labour. Hersees applied for an injunction to restrain the picketing.
On appeal, the Ontario Court of Appeal overturned the decision of
the lower court and held that the signs carried by the pickets tortiously
misrepresented that Hersees itself was involved in a labour dispute and
were designed to induce breach of contract. In addition, the Court
found that the picketing constituted "besetting" contrary to the
Criminal Code. However, Aylesworth J.A. made the following
statements in obiter at page 86:
But even assuming that the picketing carried on by the respondents was lawful in the
sense that it was merely peaceful picketing for the purpose only of communicating
information, I think it should be restrained. Appellant has a right lawfully to engage in its
business of retailing merchandise to the public.
Therefore, the right, if there be such a right, of the respondents to engage in secondary picketing
of the appellant's premises must give way to appellant's right to trade; the former, assuming it
to be a legal right, is exercised for a particular class only while the latter is a right far
more fundamental and of far greater importance, in my view, as one which in its exercise
affects and is for the benefit of the community at large.
6
These brief remarks provided the foundation for the view that
peaceful, non-tortious picketing at a location other than that of the
primary employer is illegal per se at common law.
5. Hersees of Woodstock Ltd. v. Goldstein, [1963] 2 O.R. 81 [Hersees].
6. Ibid. at 86 [emphasis added].
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As the Supreme Court acknowledged in Pepsi, the decision in Hersees
"has had an enduring-and heavily contested-influence on labour law."
7
While Canadian courts-especially in Ontario-have been compelled to
comply with the illegal per se rule enunciated in Hersees,8 many courts
have gone to remarkable lengths to avoid its strict application. Indeed,
almost before the ink was dry on Aylesworth's dictum in Hersees,
exceptions to the illegal per se doctrine began to appear. Courts in
subsequent decisions refused to restrict picketing directed at secondary
parties who were found to be effectively assisting the struck employer
(the so-called "ally" doctrine). Under the ally doctrine, the courts
permitted picketing against secondary parties who, for example, rented
hotel rooms from which the struck employer could carry on its
business,9 fulfilled the contractual obligations of the struck employer
during the course of a labour dispute"0 or permitted a struck employer
to stockpile products or continue its operations with the use of the
secondary party's warehouse facilities." Many courts elected to bypass
the issue altogether by lifting the corporate veil to characterize the
picketing in question as essentially "primary" rather than "secondary" in
nature and, therefore, not enjoinable. 12
7. Pepsi, supra note 2 at para. 52.
8. See e.g. Maple Leaf Sports & Entertainment Ltd. v. Pomeroy (1999), 49 C.L.R.B.R. (2d)
285 (Ont. Gen. Div.); Moase Siding and Insulation Ltd. v. United Food and Commercial
Workers International Union, Local 1288P (1997), 157 NfMd. & P.E.I.R. 216 (S.C.); PCL
Construction Management Inc. v. Mills (1994), 124 Sask. R. 127 (Q.B.); J.S. Ellis & Co. v.
Willis (1972), 30 D.L.R. (3d) 397 (Ont. H.C.); Toronto Harbour Commissioners v. Sninsky
(1967), 64 D.L.R. (2d) 276 (Ont. H.C.); Heather Hill Appliances Ltd. v. McCormack (1965),
52 D.L.R. (2d) 292 (Ont. H.C.) aff'g [1965] O.J. No. 504 (C.A.) [Heather Hill].
9. Commonwealth Holiday Inns of Canada Ltd. v. Sundy (1974), 2 O.R. (2d) 601 (Ont.
H.C.) [Commonwealth].
10. Air Canada v. C.A.L.P.A. (1997), 28 B.C.L.R. (3d) 159 (S.C.) [Air Canada].
11. See e.g. Peter Kiewit & Sons Co. v. Public Service Alliance of Canada, Local 20221,
[1998] B.C.J. No. 1494 (S.C.) [Peter Kiewit]; Alex Henry & Son Ltd. v. Gale (1976), 14 O.R.
(2d) 311 (Ont. H.C.) [Alex Henry].
12. See e.g. Inglis Ltd. v. Rao (1974), 2 O.R. (2d) 311 (Ont. H.C); Nedco Ltd. v. Clark
(1973), 43 D.L.R. (3d) 714 (Sask. C.A.); Nedco v. Nichols (1973), 38 D.L.R. (3d) 664 (Ont.
H.C.); Refrigeration Supplies Co. v. Ellis, [1971] 1 .R. 190 (Ont. H.C.); Lescar
Construction Co. v. Wigman, [1969] 2 O.R. 846 (Ont. H.C.).
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Accordingly, while the illegal per se doctrine continued to exist (at
least in Ontario if not elsewhere), sporadic and often overlapping
exceptions left the rule peppered with loopholes. This did little to
promote the establishment of a consistent and predictable body of
jurisprudence. As stated by Chief Justice McLachlin in Pepsi, "[t]hese
modifications to the Hersees doctrine have softened its harshest effects
on unions and picketing, but have made the common law difficult to
implement in a consistent, clear manner."' 3 Courts were often driven to
make subtle and highly subjective findings of fact relating to, for
example, whether the picketing was directed primarily at the struck
employer,14 whether the struck employer and secondary party had co-
operated to such an extent that they should be considered to be allies
under the "ally" doctrine 5 and whether the nature and extent of the
economic injury suffered by the secondary party warranted judicial
intervention. 6 The elimination of these value-laden factual inquires
appears to have been as much at the heart of the Supreme Court's
reasoning as its drive to impose constitutional norms.
II. The Supreme Court Decision in Pepsi
Almost four decades after Justice Aylesworth's controversial ruling in
Hersees, the Supreme Court seized upon the opportunity in Pepsi to
clarify whether, and under what circumstances, secondary picketing is
legal at common law.
The picketing at issue in Pepsi arose in the context of a lockout and
strike involving Pepsi-Cola Canada Beverages (West) Ltd. and certain
unionized workers employed at a bottling plant and delivery facility in
Saskatoon, Saskatchewan. While both the lockout and the resulting
13. Supra note 2 at para. 60.
14. See e.g. Peter Kiewit, supra note 11; McLean Trucking Co. v. Public Service Alliance of
Canada, [1983] B.C.J. No. 47 (S.C.).
15. See e.g. Air Canada, supra note 10; Alex Henry, supra note 11; Conmnmonwealth, supra
note 9; Falconbridge Nickel Mines Ltd. v. Tye (1971), 71 C.L.L.C. 100 (S.C.).
16. Tenen Investments Ltd. v. Wueller (1966), 66 C.L.L.C. 151 (Ont. H.C.).
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strike were legal under the Saskatchewan Trade Union Act, 7 the
animosity between the parties was evident and the situation rapidly
escalated. A number of union members reacted to news of the lockout
by taking physical control of the employer's premises, blocking access
and egress, destroying the employer's property and threatening
management personnel on site. In response, Pepsi was granted an
interim injunction prohibiting the union and its membership from
engaging in further acts of trespass, intimidation and nuisance. Pepsi
subsequently regained control of its facilities and continued its
operations with the assistance of management personnel and
replacement workers.
Upon resuming deliveries to its customers, Pepsi continued to
encounter resistance. Union members attempted to prevent the
movement of delivery trucks, interfered with the delivery of the
employer's products and dissuaded customers from carrying on business
with the employer. The union's tactics quickly spread to "secondary"
locations including retail outlets serviced by the employer, a hotel
where members of the substitute labour force were staying and the
private residences of several management personnel. While the activities
at the retail outlets and hotel were generally peaceful, the conduct of
union members at the residences of Pepsi employees included chanting
slogans, screaming insults and uttering threats. Pepsi was granted a
second interlocutory injunction, restraining the union from engaging in
such conduct.
Shortly thereafter, this second interim injunction was dissolved and a
new order instituted. As part of the new order, the union was effectively
prohibited from engaging in picketing activities anywhere other than
the employer's premises. The union appealed the provisions of the order
prohibiting secondary picketing arguing that it violated the striking
workers' rights to freedom of expression and association enshrined by
sections 2(b) and 2(d) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.8
Explaining that picketing constitutes an exercise of the fundamental
17. R.S.S. 1978, c. T-17, ss. 27 and 28.
18. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [Charter].
(2004) 29 Queen's L.J.
freedom of expression which can only be circumscribed by laws that
accord with the constitutional norms of the Charter, a majority of the
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal quashed the offending provisions of the
order. 19
In a unanimous decision by Chief Justice McLachlin and Justice LeBel,
the Supreme Court upheld the ruling of the Court of Appeal. Rejecting
the Hersees approach, even as modified by its various exceptions, the
Supreme Court concluded that secondary picketing is prima facie lawful
unless it involves wrongful action such as tortious or criminal conduct.
In the highest Court's view, this wrongful action model best balanced
the interests at stake in a manner consistent with the fundamental values
of the Charter.20 In this regard, the Court recognized that freedom of
expression is particularly significant in a labour relations context. The
Court opined that the wrongful action model provided a flexible and
rational framework that avoided reliance on artificial distinctions
between primary and secondary or labour versus non-labour picketing.
The Court asserted that while third parties should be protected from
undue economic suffering at the hands of striking unions, they should
not be insulated entirely from the repercussions of labour conflict. In
the Supreme Court's opinion, struck parties would receive adequate
protection against the most coercive forms of picketing from the torts of
nuisance, trespass, defamation and inducing breach of contract and
expressed its optimism that these torts would "grow and be adapted to
current needs." 2'
In the context of discussing the extent to which the common law
should protect the economic rights of neutral third parties, the Supreme
19. Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union Local 558 v. Pepsi-Cola Canada
Beverages (West) Ltd (1998), 167 D.L.R. (4th) 220. The Saskatchewan Court of Appeal
upheld the portion of the injunction that prevented the union from congregating at the
private residences of Pepsi employees on the basis that this was tortious conduct.
20. While the Charter does not apply directly to disputes between private litigants, the
Court in Pepsi reaffirmed its holding in Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union v.
Dolphin Delivery Ltd., [1986] 2 S.C.R. 573, that the judiciary ought to apply and develop
the principles of the common law in a manner consistent with the fundamental values
enshrined in the Constitution: Pepsi, supra note 2 at para. 19.
21. Pepsi, supra note 2 at para. 73.
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Court turned its attention to what has been called the "signalling" or
"electric fence"2 2 effect of picketing. Broadly speaking, the signalling
effect refers to the physical and psychological barrier created by a picket
line, the effect of which is to signal to potential customers that they
should refrain from doing business with the picketed party. The
appellant in Pepsi argued that the coercive nature of the signalling effect
removed picketing from the realm of protected expression. However,
while the Court admitted that there may be "a kernel of truth"23 to the
concept, it cautioned that the signalling effect will only be relevant in a
limited number of circumstances. As explained by the Court:
[T]he so-called signalling effect is probably more likely to operate in specific contexts. It
may vary sharply, depending on whether the dispute happens in a small, tightly knit and
highly unionized community, or at a strongly organized construction site used by several
employers ... In a large urban centre, where the population is diverse, and where the per
capita unionization rate is low, the signalling effect may be exaggerated.
24
Continuing along this vein, the Supreme Court drew a distinction
between picketing directed at disrupting the business operations of the
neutral party and picketing that is aimed merely at persuading
customers not to purchase the products of the struck employer sold by
the neutral party. In the Court's view, the coercive potential of the
picket line would be greatly diminished where the secondary picketing
in question is directed specifically at the products of the struck
employer.
In support of this analysis, the Supreme Court relied on the following
statement by the United States Supreme Court in Tree Fruits:
All that the legislative history shows in the way of an "isolated evil" believed to require
proscription of peaceful consumer picketing at secondary sites, was its use to persuade the
customers of the secondary employer to cease trading with him in order to force him to
cease dealing with, or to put pressure upon, the primary employer. This narrow focus
reflects the difference between such conduct and peaceful picketing at the secondary site
22. See the comments of Stewart J. in Heather Hill, supra note 8 at 13.
23. Pepsi, supra note 2 at para. 95.
24. Ibid. at para. 95.
(2004) 29 Queen's L.J.
directed only at the struck product. In the latter case, the union's appeal to the public is
confined to its dispute with the primary employer, since the public is not asked to
withhold its patronage from the secondary employer, but only to boycott the primary
employer's goods. On the other hand, a union appeal to the public at the secondary site
not to trade at all with the secondary employer goes beyond the goods of the primary
employer, and seeks the public's assistance in forcing the secondary employer to
cooperate with the union in its primary dispute.
Peaceful consumer picketing to shut off all trade with the secondary employer unless he
aids the union in its dispute with the primary employer, is poles apart from such
picketing which only persuades his customers not to buy the struck product.
25
Armed with these statements, the Supreme Court in Pepsi concluded
that "we should therefore be mindful not to extend the application of
the signal effect to all forms of union expression." 2 It is the Supreme
Court's reliance upon Tree Fruits-and more importantly the Court's
adoption of the questionable distinction between general and struck
product picketing-that constitutes the primary focus of this comment.
III. Secondary Picketing in the U.S.: Tree Fruits
and Its Progeny
As illustrated above, the observations of the United States Supreme
Court in Tree Fruits figure prominently in the judgment of Justices
McLachlin and LeBel in Pepsi. However, a closer review of Tree Fruits
reveals a decision that is rife with analytical and practical shortcomings
which have contributed to the development of a remarkably
unprincipled and convoluted body of American jurisprudence.
The dispute in Tree Fruits arose following the expiration of a collective
agreement between the Tree Fruits Labor Relations Committee, a multi-
employer bargaining agent representing several produce distributors,
and the Fruit & Vegetable Packers and Warehousemen's Union, Local
760. In response to certain proposed contract modifications which it
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25. Tree Fruits, supra note 3 at 63-64 and 70.
26. Ibid. at para. 100.
deemed unacceptable, Local 760 called a strike against the members of
the committee and two independent employers. To further its
bargaining objectives, Local 760 subsequently decided to promote a
consumer boycott of Washington State apples. This boycott entailed
picketing and the distribution of handbills at 46 Safeway stores in and
around Seattle, Washington which sold apples distributed by the struck
employers. The pickets carried placards that stated: "To the Consumer:
Non-Union Washington State apples are being sold at this store. Please
do not purchase such apples." The handbills contained similar language
and outlined in more detail the nature and background of the dispute.
The picketing at each of the Safeway locations remained peaceful and at
no time interfered with the movement of store employees, customers or
suppliers. In response to the union's tactics, an application was brought
under, inter alia, section 8(b) (4)(ii) (B) of the National Labor Relations Act
which states that it is an unfair labour practice for a union "to threaten,
coerce, or restrain any person" with the object of "forcing or requiring
any person to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise
dealing in the products of any other producer... or to cease doing
business with any other person...."27
In a six to two decision by Justice Brennan, the U.S. Supreme Court
held that section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) did not prohibit peaceful consumer
picketing of neutral parties directed solely at persuading customers not
to purchase the products of the struck employer. As previously noted,
the majority drew a hard and fast distinction between struck product
picketing and picketing designed to shut off all trade with the neutral
party. In support of its conclusion, the majority in Tree Fruits observed
that Congress had historically refused to prohibit peaceful picketing
except in order to restrain "clearly identified abuses."
28
27. 29 U.S.C. 151-168. The National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act) was enacted
in 1935 (29 U.S.C. 141-169), as amended by the Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-
Hartley Act) in 1947 (29 U.S.C. § § 141-197). The National Labor Relations Act was
amended to include section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) by the Labor-Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act (Landrum-Griffin Act) in 1959 (29 U.S.C. 401-531) [NLRA].
28. Supra note 3 at 67. The majority in Tree Fruits held that while the distinction was
not explicitly recognized by Congress in its debates regarding the enactment of section
(2004) 29 Queen's L.J.
In addition, the majority expressed its concern that a "broad ban
against peaceful picketing might collide with the guarantees of the First
Amendment." 29  Accordingly, as the picketing in Tree Fruits was
ostensibly confined to persuading customers not to purchase the
products of the struck employer, the majority held that it did not fall
within the scope of section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B).
In their dissent, Justices Harlan and Stewart asserted that, given the
very nature of picketing, many consumers would refrain from doing
business with a neutral party "out of economic or social conviction or
because they prefer to shop where they need not brave a picket line."3
Moreover, Justice Harlan argued that many consumers, not
comprehending the precise scope of the picketing, would not confine
their boycott to the products of the struck employer.3 1 In either
instance, and regardless of the intended effect of the picketing, the net
result would be a defacto boycott of trade with the neutral party. As a
result, the minority in Tree Fruits was of the opinion that the distinction
created by the majority was "too refined in the context of reality," 32
potentially becoming "even more tenuous if a picketed retailer depends
largely or entirely on sales of the struck product." 33 While the views of
Justices Harlan and Stewart did not win the day, their criticisms of the
majority opinion foreshadowed many of the practical difficulties
subsequently experienced by courts and the National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB) in attempting to apply the Tree Fruits doctrine.
The analytical and practical shortcomings of the Tree Fruits doctrine,
many of which were almost immediately identified in academic circles,34
are painfully evident upon a review of the subsequent jurisprudence.
Most of these problems can be attributed to the fact that, as recognized
8(b)(4)(ii)(B), their silence in this respect was "pregnant with significance"-indicating that
legislators did not manifest any intention of banning all forms of consumer picketing.
29. Ibid at 63.
30. Ibid. at 82-83.
31. Ibid. at 83.
32. Ibid. at 82.
33. Ibid. at 83.
34. See e.g. Thomas P. Lewis, "Consumer Picketing and the Court-The Questionable
Yield of Tree Fruits" (1965) 49 Minn. L. Rev. 479.
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by Justice Harlan in his dissent in Tree Fruits, the Supreme Court failed
to fully comprehend the unique economic dynamics intrinsic to labour
disputes, the underlying motives of unions engaging in secondary
picketing, and the psychological effects of picketing on members of the
public. As one observer stated:
... the confusion surrounding existing board and court interpretations of section
8(b)(4)(ii)(B) stems from the Supreme Court's failure to assess realistically the impact that
consumer picketing has on secondary businesses, as well as the Court's refusal to examine
the objectives of unions that resort to secondary picketing.
3 5
This problem was compounded by the courts' inability-in both Tree
Fruits and subsequent decisions-to articulate a clear and consistent
approach to the application of section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B). Indeed, at least one
member of the NLRB observed that the Supreme Court's failure to
formulate a principled basis for its decisions in the area of secondary
consumer picketing has produced a "convoluted statute that has been
muddied and distorted by judicial interpretation." 6 These flaws in the
Court's analysis have subsequently manifested themselves in myriad of
different factual circumstances and resulted in the development of a
number of modifications to the Tree Fruits doctrine.
One of the most obvious criticisms of the ruling in Tree Fruits has
been that the distinction between general and struck product picketing
becomes impractical and yields unduly oppressive results where the
neutral party is economically dependent on the struck employer. This
will be of particular concern where the neutral party is engaged
exclusively or primarily in the sale of the products of the struck
employer. As former NLRB Chairman William B. Gould IV explained,
where the neutral party is dependent in this respect, "[ilt is impossible
35. Author unknown, "Secondary Consumer Picketing, Statutory Interpretation and
the First Amendment" (1983) 81 Mich. L. Rev. 1817.
36. Zimmerman, "The Changing Arsenal of Economic Weapons: Consequences for
Section 8(b)(4), the Board and the Courts", (1982) 34 Proc. N.Y.U. Conf. on Lab. 79, 80
at 94, cited in Author unknown, "Secondary Consumer Picketing, Statutory
Interpretation and the First Amendment" (1983) 81 Mich. L. Rev. 1817 at 1817.
(2004) 29 Queen's L.J.
for the union to confine its appeal to the primary employer in a way
that will not be aimed at the entire structure of the secondary
employer."37 This problem led to an attempt by the Supreme Court to
reassess the parameters of the Tree Fruits doctrine in NLRB v. Retail
Store Employees Union, Local 1001 (Safeco Title Insurance Corporation).38
In Safeco, the union targeted several neutral parties that each derived
approximately 90 percent of their business from the struck employer.
While the Supreme Court acknowledged that the union's picketing was
directed exclusively at Safeco's insurance products, it nevertheless held
that the picketing of the neutral parties constituted an unfair labour
practice contrary to section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B). In the Court's view, given that
the sale of the struck employer's products accounted for substantially all
of the neutral parties' business, it could be inferred that the picketing
was reasonably calculated to induce customers to withhold their
patronage of the neutral parties. In so holding, the Supreme Court
articulated an important exception to the Tree Fruits doctrine: picketing
that can be expected to threaten neutral parties with "ruin or substantial
loss"39 should be restrained. However, as noted by Justice Brennan in his
dissent in Safeco, the decision left unanswered the question of how to
approach the infinite number of situations that reside somewhere in
between Tree Fruits and Safeco on the spectrum of economic
dependence.4" To this day, neither the U.S. courts nor the NLRB have
articulated an acceptably clear or consistent approach to this important
question.
Safeco is particularly illuminating from a Canadian post-Pepsi
perspective in that it requires U.S. courts to measure the quantum of
economic harm inflicted on targets of secondary picketing activities in
determining both the level of economic dependence and whether the
target was threatened with "ruin or substantial loss." Canadian courts
37. William B. Gould IV, A Primer on American Labor Law, 3d ed. (Cambridge, Mass.:
MIT Press, 1993) at 81.
38. NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union, Local 1001 (Safeco Title Insurance Corporation)
447 U.S. 607 (1980) [Safeco].
39. Safeco, supra note 38 at 614-615.
40. Ibid. at 623-624.
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will almost certainly have to address such issues when forced to
reconcile complex labour relations and constitutional issues within the
stunted rubric of nominate and industrial torts. Given the inability of
U.S. courts after Safeco to articulate a clear approach to these issues, not
to mention Justice Brennan's observation that Safeco provides an
inadequate analytical framework for cases that fall somewhere between
Tree Fruits and Safeco, the decision represents a shining example of why
the Tree Fruits approach should be viewed with a healthy dose of
scepticism.
Another commonly cited shortcoming of the decision in Tree Fruits is
that the Supreme Court failed to take into account situations where the
struck product has somehow been integrated or merged with a product
offered for sale by the neutral party. In an attempt to address this
deficiency, courts and the NLRB have subsequently developed what is
known as the "merged product doctrine." The essence of the merged
product doctrine is that secondary picketing is illegal where the struck
product has become so integrated or merged with the product of the
neutral party as to be no longer identifiable to the public at large. The
assumption underlying this rule is that, in order to boycott the product
of the struck employer, the consumer would simultaneously be required
to reject the product of the neutral party and, potentially, any number
of component products produced by other neutral parties.41 The merged
product doctrine is intended to insulate neutral third parties who would
otherwise be drawn into the primary dispute. However, while the
merged product doctrine may possess a certain ethereal appeal, it has
proved difficult to apply. Examples of struck products which have
proven problematic include bread used by a restaurant; 42 raw materials,
tools and components used in the construction of buildings;4 3 and paper
bags used by a grocer to pack groceries. 44
41. See Ashton Phelps Jr., "Secondary Consumer Picketing: Some Grafts on Tree
Fruits" (April 1970) 44 Tul. L. Rev. 537 at 543.
42. Teamsters, Local 327(American Bread Co.), 170 N.L.R.B. 91 (1968).
43. See e.g. K&K Construction Co. v. NLRB, 592 F.2d 1228 (3d Cir. 1979); Twin City
Carpenters, 167 N.L.R.B. No. 151 (1967).
44. Paperworkers, Local 832 (Duro Paper Bag Mfg. Co.), 236 N.L.R.B. 525 (1978).
(2004) 29 Queen's L.J.
The practical limits of the merged product doctrine together with the
inherent limitations of the distinction between general and struck
product picketing, are particularly evident in Raywood Corp. v. Radio
Broadcast Technicians, Local 1264.4" In Raywood, a striking union
picketed a television station that aired advertisements featuring the
products of the struck retailers. The Court in this case, which ultimately
held that the picketing was not protected under the Tree Fruits doctrine,
clearly struggled to distinguish between the advertisements themselves
and the struck products described and depicted therein. Problems can
also arise where the struck employer provides services-as opposed to
products-to neutral third parties. In such cases, the distinction between
general and struck product picketing predictably breaks down because
there is no identifiable product capable of being the target of a boycott.46
Yet another concern emanating from the decision in Tree Fruits stems
from the significance that the Supreme Court attached to the union's
apparent motives in determining whether the picketing of the Safeway
stores should have been restrained. Specifically, the majority in Tree
Fruits held that section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) will only be violated where it can be
established that any reduction in the sales of the struck employer's
products to the neutral party was precipitated by the neutral party's
submission to the union's coercive tactics, and not merely as the result
of lessened consumer demand. 47 Aside from the challenging cause-and-
effect evidentiary issues that arise, the shortcoming of this view is that it
fails to acknowledge that the interference with business between the
struck employer and the neutral party is almost always one of the
underlying motives of secondary picketing. Secondary picketing is
designed to be coercive. The Supreme Court's holding in this respect
thus implicitly discounts the impact of secondary picketing on the day-
to-day operations, reputation and bottom line of the neutral parties. In
45. Raywood Corp. v. Radio Broadcast Technicians, Local 1264 290 F. Supp. 1008 (S.D.
Ala. 1968) [Raywood.].
46. See e.g. Local 254, Building Service Employees (University Cleaning Co.), 151 N.L.R.B.
341 (1965), 376 F. 2d 131 (1st Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 856 (1967); Local 105,
Building Service Employees, 151 N.L.R.B. 1424 (1965), 367 F. 2d 227 (10th Cir. 1966).
47. Tree Fruits, supra note 3 at 72-73.
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an effort to properly recognize and protect the economic rights of
neutral third parties, U.S. courts have struggled to create exceptions to
the Tree Fruits doctrine.
Underlying the many practical shortcomings of the decision in Tree
Fruits is the Supreme Court's singular focus on the literal content of the
message disseminated by striking unions to members of the public.
Indeed, the distinction between general and struck product picketing-
and thus the distinction between permissible and impermissible
picketing under section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B)-rests on the wording of the
placards, handbills and other means used by unions to reach their
intended audience. Where, as in Tree Fruits, the union's message to
consumers is restricted to the products of the struck employer, the
picketing will be deemed permissible. However, where the union's
message is not circumscribed in this manner, the picketing will
constitute an unfair labour practice. As observed by Justice Black in his
concurring opinion in Tree Fruits:
In short, we have neither a case in which picketing is banned because the picketers are
asking others to do something unlawful nor a case in which all picketing is, for reasons of
public order, banned. Instead, we have a case in which picketing, otherwise lawful, is banned
only when the picketers express particular views.
48
As Justice Harlan asserts, the most significant side effect of the
Supreme Court's reasoning in this respect is that the Tree Fruits doctrine
failed to give due consideration to the inherent expressive elements of
the physical act of picketing and its psychological and economic
consequences. Somewhat ironically, the Court's focus in Tree Fruits on
the wording of the placards appears to have distracted it from the
message that the placards themselves sent to potential consumers.
Perhaps recognizing this, the Supreme Court in Safeco subsequently
acknowledged the potential impact of the signalling effect of picketing.
As Justice Stevens states in his concurring opinion in Safeco, "[i]n the
labor context, it is the conduct element rather than the particular idea
(2004) 29 Queen's L.J.
48. Ibid. at 79 [emphasis added].
being expressed that often provides the most persuasive deterrent to
third persons about to enter a business establishment."49
While the judicial and academic debate surrounding the decision of the
U.S. Supreme Court in Tree Fruits has abated somewhat in recent years,
the ratio in Tree Fruits has never expressly been overridden. To this day,
it presents the American judiciary with practical obstacles primarily in
the form of the numerous difficult-to-apply exceptions which developed
in its wake."0 Although the controversy has subsided somewhat, the
lessons learned in the aftermath of Tree Fruits are equally as relevant and
important today as they were four decades ago. Nevertheless, the
Supreme Court of Canada in Pepsi relied heavily on this dubious
decision to restrict the potential import of the signalling effect and,
indirectly, to bolster its own argument in support of the wrongful
action model. In doing so, the Court gave short shrift to the practical
and analytical shortcomings of the Tree Fruits doctrine as exposed by
subsequent academic and judicial criticism of the decision.
IV. Thoughts for the Pepsi generation:
Secondary Picketing in the Wake of Pepsi
Similarities between Tree Fruits and Pepsi exist on a number of levels.
In both cases, the highest court rejected a doctrine which held secondary
49. Safeco, supra note 38 at 619.
50. In addition, it should be noted that the U.S. jurisprudence on secondary picketing
manifests a number of important distinctions which continue to be litigated. Notable
distinctions include those relating to picketing versus handbilling and secondary picketing
designed to induce employees of the target to take job action versus secondary picketing
designed to dissuade customers from patronizing the target or from purchasing products
of the primary employer (i.e., consumer picketing): see e.g. EdwardJ. DeBartolo Corp. v.
Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568 (1988) and Warshawskv, &
Company v. N.L.R.B., 182 F.3d 948 (D.C. Cir. 1999). While these distinctions raise several
important and interesting questions (i.e., at what point does handbilling become
picketing? On what basis is a court supposed to make this distinction?), these issues are
largely irrelevant in the context of the present article both because they were not
recognized by the Supreme Court in Pepsi and because, in the case of handbilling, the
issue has arguably been settled in Canada: see U.F.C.W, Local 1518, v. Kmart Canada
Ltd., [1999] 2 S.C.R. 1083.
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picketing illegal per se in favour of a less restrictive approach. In
addition, both decisions were clearly influenced by underlying
constitutional considerations and the desire to protect a striking union's
right to freedom of expression. However, while there are numerous
lessons to be learned from Tree Fruits and its progeny, the American
experience is not so much a precedent as a cautionary tale.
As illustrated by subsequent U.S. jurisprudence, the distinction
between general and struck product picketing set out in Tree Fruits and
embraced by the Supreme Court of Canada in Pepsi has proven difficult
to apply in practice. It has resulted in a struggle to establish exceptions
to the general rule that can be applied to the practical realities of
industrial conflict. In this respect, the Supreme Court's unexamined
reliance on Tree Fruits stands in stark contrast to its stated objectives of
avoiding "difficult and arbitrary"51 distinctions and the ad hoc exceptions
which typified the modified Hersees doctrine. Furthermore, as in Tree
Fruits, the Court in Pepsi underestimates the coercive potential of the
signalling effect. In so doing Justices McLachlin and LeBel effectively
disregarded the statements of Justice Stevens in Safeco in which he
acknowledges the signalling effect as "the most persuasive deterrent" to
the public from doing business with a struck party.
The obvious and concerning question which arises is whether the
decision in Pepsi has sent the Canadian judiciary down the same kind of
path that caused its U.S. counterparts such difficulties in the aftermath
of Tree Fruits. The answer to this question is still unclear, but what can
be said is that the Supreme Court of Canada has done little in its
decision in Pepsi to guide decision-makers down a more certain path.
Indeed, the judgement of Justices McLachlin and LeBel manifests its
own potential shortcomings. Principal amongst these is the Supreme
Court's apparent optimism respecting the capacity of nominate and
industrial torts to "grow and be adapted" to provide adequate protection
to the economic and property rights of neutral parties. In so doing, the
Court is counting a great deal on what one observer has characterized as
"a disreputable old body of caselaw that has persistently defied clear
(2004) 29 Queen's L.J.
51. Pepsi, supra note 2 at paras. 79-80.
analysis and predictable, even-handed application."52 As the Nova Scotia
Court of Appeal recently stated, "the invocation of these torts in the
labour relations context is particularly troublesome and nonetheless so
in light of the fact that most areas of labour relations law have been
trusted primarily, if not exclusively, to specialized labour relations
tribunals."53
Should the nominate and industrial torts identified in Pepsi prove
ineffective in regulating secondary picketing, the Supreme Court has
arguably left open the possibility that injunctive relief may be granted
where the signalling effect of the conduct in question is deemed
excessive. It is not entirely clear, however, whether the Supreme Court
envisioned "excessive signalling" as a stand alone basis for relief under
the wrongful action model, or simply an analytical tool designed to
assist courts in determining whether an independent tort has been
committed. Regardless of its intention in this respect, the Supreme
Court has attempted to define the circumstances in which the signalling
effect will cross the line from acceptable persuasion to enjoinable
coercion. In drawing this distinction, however, the Court suggests that
judges must take into account a myriad of factors including the size of
the community in which the dispute occurs, the diversity and per capita
unionization rate of its population and union strength in the affected
industry.54 This will require judges to make highly subjective findings
from which to draw questionable inferences which may or may not be
corroborated by empirical evidence. As a result, not only does Pepsi
leave subsequent courts to speculate as to the precise relevance of the
signalling effect within the Court's "wrongful action" framework, the
decision articulates a test for determining its relevance that may itself be
deceptive.
52. Bernard Adell, "Secondary Picketing after Pepsi-Cola: What's Clear and What Isn't"
(2003) 10 C.L.E.L.J. 135 at 146.
53. Industrial Union of Marine and Shipbuilding Workers of Canada, Local I v. LB.E.W,
Local 625 (2002), 203 N.S.R. (2d) 362 (C.A.) at paras. 38-39.
54. Pepsi, supra note 2 at para. 95.
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Conclusion
As once observed by Oliver Wendell Holmes, "the life of the law has
not been logic: it has been experience."15 While it is perhaps premature
to render a verdict on the wisdom of the Supreme Court of Canada's
decision in Pepsi, the Court appears to have been blind to the lessons of
the American jurisprudential history that followed the U.S. Court's
pronouncement in Tree Fruits. With its wholesale condemnation of the
illegal per se doctrine and the experience of the courts that followed, the
Supreme Court has effectively denied itself the benefit of a practical
labour relations perspective on secondary picketing, a perspective that is
conspicuously absent from the wrongful action model. The Court has
not established a clearer doctrine. Rather, it has established a new point
of departure from which those involved in labour disputes will set sail
on a voyage of exceptions, value judgements and unpredictability.
Fifteen years from now those engaged in this voyage may well find
themselves at a destination that is strikingly similar to where they were
just prior to the Court's decision in Pepsi.
55. "Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Common Law, (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1923)
at 1.
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